§ 1. The dates for Peisistratus’ reigns and exiles in the Athenaion Politeia, as given in the papyrus, which is the sole authority for the text, are as follows.

In consulatu sexto et septimo postquam bella civilia exstinxeram per consensum universorum [potitus rerum own]ium rem publicam ex mea potestate in senat[us populique Romani a]rbitrium transtuli. There is very little doubt about the reading of the Latin text, except that the Greek has suggested to Schönbauer that ‘compos’ should be read for ‘potitus’. He urges that ‘compos’ has a ‘milder meaning’ than ‘potitus’ and has no connotation of the use of force. The change to ‘compos’ is worthy of consideration, but (...) suggests that the Latin ran ‘compos factus’ if ‘compos’ was used, and the phrase ‘compos factus’, though good Augustan Latin, is perhaps too retarding in rhythm to fit this place, though to that stylistic feeling too much weight should not be assigned. (shrink)

It may be affirmed with some confidence that on this topic no generally accepted solution will be found in default of new evidence, for which we can only faintly hope. Against certainty on the matter it would seem that the Everlasting has fixed his canon: quis iustius induit arma scire nefas. Dogmatism is out of place; we must be content with whatever theory is least difficult to reconcile with the texts and with a reasonable interpretation of the course of events (...) at the time and the comments on them of contemporary observers. The thesis advanced in this paper is that there are strong reasons for supposing that the Lex Pompeia Licinia contained a date by which Caesar's command ended, that this date was not the end of February of the year 50 or the year 49 or the end of December of the year 50, that it did not contain a clause forbidding the discussion of a successor to Caesar before March 1, 50, and that if the date ending his command lies between the end of February and the end of December of the year 50, it may have been in fact the Ides of November in that year. (shrink)

The encounter between Socrates and Thrasymachus in Republic I is notoriously baffling. Most of what is said seems straightforward, and the issues at stake are ones of common concern, but the argument remains elusive. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature and grounds of this elusiveness, and to show that some of it can be dispelled by a sufficiently free-ranging exegesis that bears in mind the general character of Plato’s writing.

A short collection of random quotations concerning a number of diverse philosophical topics.--F. E. B.

The author conceives of his grandiose world view and proposals for biological human selectivity as based on a new scientific philosophy, but the book seems to share little with either organized science or disciplined philosophy.--F. E. B.

Wind makes abundant references to such classical philosophers as Plato, Plotinus, and Seneca in his elucidation of Renaissance works of art in terms of pagan myths and rites. His study is scholarly and full and is well illustrated with excellent plates.--F. E. B.

In this extended examination of the Oxford deontologists' claim that rightness cannot be based upon goodness, Johnson argues that although the deontologists' arguments against the utilitarians are valid, their positive position must be rejected. Because Ross's "ought-can" argument and the "infinite regress" argument break down, the moral goodness of motives must be regarded as a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral rightness. Johnson proposes an alternative axiology theory which includes an "organic" as well as a moral and utilitarian goodness.--F. (...) E. B. (shrink)

Melden approaches some important ethical problems by a careful analysis of moral rights in the moral community. A right for him is a moral role or status in the moral community; that community is served and preserved by right action. The discussion, although extremely succinct at times, ranges over a number of important points. -- F. E. B.

This is the best general book available in English on Plutarch, written by the foremost scholar at Oxford in the Greek literature of this period, containing many fresh insights, along with a clear grasp of the subject and accurate scholarship. The scope is wide: Plutarch’s life; the language; style; and form of his writings; his sources and method of writing; his philosophy and religion; the moral essays and his humanism; the nature of the Lives; and the inevitable Nachleben. The size, (...) unfortunately, is small. (shrink)

This brief book surveys the theories of four German psychologists/philosophers, Wolff, Tetens, Wundt, and Brentano, in order to describe the transition in rationalistic psychology from a static to a dynamic concept of thought. Rappard presents this notion as a valuable corrective to the positivistic approach which has tended to predominate: for "sensory immediacy," the direct evidence of the data of the senses, these thinkers substitute "nonsensory immediacy," the direct evidence of the primordial activity of knowledge, which is only later differentiated (...) into inner and outer, self and other. This immediacy is self-knowledge, since the primary object of knowledge must first be the activity of knowing itself, prior to the separation from it of "activity centre" and "activity object". This nonsensory immediacy is in fact identified with the cogito, though it is not clear why the subject-side of such an original unity should thus be stressed. (shrink)

This book, a transcript of a conference held at the State University of New York at Stony Brook on May 5-6, 1977, exhibits the liveliness of active discussion among contemporary experts as well as the digressions and lack of focus often found in such discussions. The introduction compares the papers to the spokes of a wheel with Piaget's epistemology at its center; after an opening summary by Hans Furth, each writer draws a relationship between Piaget and some other thinker, so (...) that the essays form relatively independent forays into philosophical psychology. (shrink)

Of the platonic theory that four qualities make up the whole of virtue. I show that aristotle's repudiation of this scheme is more apparent than real.

F. E. Sparshott; IV—Avowals and their Uses, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 63–76, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.